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Abstract
This paper focuses on the changes in farm efficiency as a tool for policy analysis. The
methodology is applied to the introduction of direct payments (DP) and the price sup-
port reduction affecting large samples of individual farms with joint animal and vegetal
production (comparing before and after CAP’92). The case study is justified for their
relevance for Mediterranean forest and grazing land preservation in Spain. Using a
non parametric method (DEA) we do not specify the production function of the farms,
and can explain the impact of the direct payments on environmental adaptation and
efficiency for animal orientated farms before and after the (DP) introduction in 1992
(CAP’92 reform). Even though the direct payments increased sharply after the CAP’92
reform, in general, the new direct payment system turns out to be insufficient to off-
set the fact that less environmentally friendly farms remain much more “efficient,” i.e.
profitable for the farmer. The paper also studies the relationship of efficiency with other
policy relevant factors such as economic size. The results show that after the CAP’92
reform, the subsidy schedule was even more correlated with farm size than before, which
we find to be counterproductive.1
Keywords: Common Agricultural Policy, subsidies, efficiency, non-parametric meth-
ods, natural resources, environmental economics.
1This research was supported by FUNCAS, the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture and the “Direccio´n
General de Investigacio´n del Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnolog´ıa”, project number SEJ2005-08269/ECON
and SEJ2004-04583/ECON.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of Direct Payments on factors such as
efficiency before and after the Common Agricultural Policy reform of 1992 (CAP’92) in
Spain. In particular, we will look at the impact of the CAP on the efficiency of animal ori-
ented farms. In general, animal density and environmental friendliness are strongly related,
so we will use these expressions synonymously in the following. In fact, the EU defines
environmental friendliness via animal density. We will discuss this point later in this paper.
The introduction of direct payments (DP), reinforced strongly by the CAP’92, was expected
to have an important impact on efficiency as well as on the environmental adaptation of
farms. Given the increasing role that direct payments will play in the future distribution
of resources to support the farmers of the European Union, a quantitative framework to
measure the degree to which programs are biased either against or in favor of farm efficiency
is highly relevant.
For the preservation of large extensions of forest and grasslands in Spain the key farms are
those oriented to animal production partially based on their own, including rented, land’s
vegetal output. In fact, the Mediterranean forest and the traditional techniques of livestock
raising are frequently close to ecological farming. Under the CAP, especially after the ’92
reform, there was a potential contradiction between several policy targets: intervention
price reduction and a rise in the environmental adaptation of farms and improvement of
efficiency. We explore the ex-post effects on farms using a data-set of a representative sample
of individual holdings. Farm technologies allow for shifting between different proportions of
animal and vegetal products.
Efficiency and environmental adaptation have become key issues in new European agricul-
tural policy. A step towards an agreement in the WTO (World Trade Organization) and to
the decoupling of income from prices was the agreement of the Council of Ministers in June
2003, the Mid-Term Review of the Common Agricultural Politic [CAP MTR]. Additionally,
the CAP MTR introduces a modulation of the direct payment, for example limiting direct
payments by size. In view of the new CAP reform which is in force since 2005, it would
be interesting to look back and study the effects of the previous reform CAP’92, especially
regarding those aspects tackled by the recent reform like the substitution of price support
by a single payment.
The current CAP 2003 reform is, in many ways, a step ahead on the basic principles and
tools introduced in the CAP’92 reform to control over-production by reducing intervention
price and to use DP to compensate farmers for their income losses.
The first step of the recent CAP reform was to introduce direct payments and cut the
intervention price while trying to reduce intervention stocks. Just to give an idea of the
importance of DP: currently, due to the CAP, 4.50 million farmers benefit from subsidies
of 24.8 billion Euros at the EU 15 level. Part of that goes to Spain where 4.89 thousand
beneficiaries received 2.98 billion Euros. On average, the farms in Spain receive fewer in
DP per holding than the average EU farm. Note also that so far, the allocation of direct
spending among farmers has been known to be unequal in two ways: First, the bulk of
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direct income support is concentrated in a few beneficiaries. For example, the Commission
acknowledges that in the 2000-01 financial year, only 12.2% of beneficiaries received 69.21%
of all payments in 14 EU2 states. In the case of Spain, 9.3% of beneficiaries received 59.18%
of all payments and 18.43% of the Spanish farmers received 75.86 per cent of DP. This is
mainly due to the direct or indirect link of direct payments to economic size. Second, the
distribution of direct aid payments among animal type and / or crop is very asymmetrical
and is spread over several regulations. The most important action under which farmers
receive income is the set-aside program and animal premiums. As a result, the percentage of
payments which were directed towards arable crops and livestock in the year 2000 amounted
to 92.71 and 79.78% of all payments in the EU and Spain respectively. With the information
available as to the distribution of direct income payments by crops, it is easy to contrast
the asymmetries on the distribution for Spain: under livestock premiums 185.4 thousand
beneficiaries received 974 million Euros while for arable crops 373.9 thousand of beneficiaries
received 2.013 million Euros.
For our purposes it is important to point out that the typical holdings with vegetal and
animal production can collect DP from several programs. We are interested in those types of
farms because of their potential for cross-compliance. In fact, this type of land management
provides important opportunities for a trade off between environment preservation and gains
in efficiency using intensive techniques. The most obvious alternatives are the choice in the
proportions of animal nutrients cropped or grazed on the farm versus feedstuff provided
by the industry. There is also the choice between traditional and specialized (intensive)
livestock breeds. Note that the spread of epidemics is often strongly related to the ratio of
land per animal units. So for example the mad cow outbreak is a result of industrial feeding.
As far as we know, despite of its relevance, few empirical studies counterpoint whether
the CAP’92 increments in direct payments were attach to a better levels in efficiency or
environmental adaptation, or wether they have decreased the asymmetry between large and
small holdings. Critics even forecasted a negative incentive to improve productivity. Our aim
is to analyze the distortions in efficiency due to CAP subsidies before and after the CAP’92,
and ascertain whether the direct payments that farmers received actually resulted in more
environmentally friendly farming. We also address the issue of the relationship between
efficiency and size as it is theoretically unclear whether subsidies allow inefficient holdings
to survive or help them to catch up the production frontier. A second (hypothetical) scenario
(calculating efficiency without direct payments) allows us to compare whether (before and
after the CAP’92) direct subsidies helped farms to reach the efficiency frontier.
To study these questions, we decided to concentrate on only one country to guarantee certain
homogeneity and reduce the variance. Note that the CAP has the same principles in all of
the EU states, so a single country can be interpreted as a case study for various EU sates.
However, we are aware of the fact that the CAP’92 has some measure which differently apply
in different Member States and regions. Spain is an interesting case for its large size (in
surface its 7.2 millions of Ha of grazing lands and 3.4 millions of hectares of cultivated lands),
2The 15 old Member States except Greece, for which no published data is available. Figures account for
the directs aids pay to farmers under the Reg. (EC) 1259/1999. Commission, MEMO/02/198 and AGRI
63569/2002
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export oriented agriculture (more than 55% of exports over the total output), with 37.9%
of its agricultural output in livestock raising in 2001 (MAPA, 2004 Anuario de Estad´ıstica
Agraria 2003), and also because of the availability of large data samples for each type of
animal farming. In 2001, Spain accounted for 14.32% of the vegetal output and 11.08% of
animal output of the EU15 (Eurostat, 2003. European Economic Accounts. SEC-95).
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyze the impact on efficiency of the sharp increment
of DP introduced by the CAP’92 reform. The way of modelling is not neutral to the results;
for example, several papers assume functional forms that implicitly accept the existence of
constant returns to scale or no limits for the scope of technical change. For our analysis
we always use non- or semi parametric methods when (mis-)specifications could provoke
serious disturbances in our conclusions. This greatly increases the econometric effort as well
as the variance of our results but avoids any controversy as to the influence of subjective
modelling.
One of our key results shows that, on average, absolute direct payments generally tend to
increase efficiency (i.e. efficiency in monetary terms) but not productivity (i.e. efficiency
in physical terms). However, in most of the cases the mean efficiency decreases as the
percentage of direct payments rises. So the CAP’03 idea of modulation or capping of direct
subsidies in the future will potentially increase the efficiency of the public expenses on DP.
Thus, the implications of this work are important for the future application of the recently
approved CAP Reform 2003 on an historical basis. Applying the CAP reform on “historical
basis” means translating the unequal distribution of subsidies throughout intervention prices
and direct subsidies into a single payment to each farm. Results can potentially be translated
into promoting the wrong type of farming, as in past years, for example, the conversion of
price support into direct payments based on the previous year’s level of protection. Thus
potential implications of efficiency will affect agricultural competitiveness and have to be
carefully analyzed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the data
and methods we will use for our study. After that we dedicate a large section to the
presentation of the numerical results and their interpretations. Finally, we conclude. Some
technical details of the procedures are given in the appendix of this article.
2 Data and Procedure
The Spanish sample was obtained from the Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN) which
provides homogeneous information for farms and classifies them in types of animal farming
with positive plant production. We concentrate on cross sectional analysis for the years 1991,
1992 (before CAP’92 reform) and 1999, 2000 (after CAP’92 enforcement). We have chosen
these years aiming to have data of average weather conditions and sufficiently delay to allow
capturing the changes by the complete enforcement of the reforms and farmer reactions
to the new policy environment. The same FADN survey provides detailed information on
input expenditures by farm. For the selected farms, livestock production (meat and animal
products) is always greater than plant output (fodder, field crop, grain cereals, vineyards,
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potatoes, industrial crops, plants, fruits, dried pulses, olive groves and others) to ensure
that we only include farms oriented to livestock raising. Plant production however is always
positive in the selected sample to ensure that the production function remains homogenous
by type of animal farming. We only want to include farms with similar production func-
tions, e.g. oriented to animal production, but also with the possibility of harvesting plant
products for re-use on the farm or for sale. We consider that farms with no-land (not even
rented land) have a non-comparable production function and will therefore be excluded.
For technical reasons when using DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) the identification of
an efficiency frontier is only possible if the individual production function of the farms is
similar. Finally, as we are interested in the impact on efficiency at a farm level, instead
of using aggregated data we use individual farm accounting data that include any kind of
direct payment received.
In Tables 1 and 2 are summarized the number of farms used for all our estimations, separated
by year and animal type.
′91 ′92 ′99 ′00
sheep and goat 391 373 553 679
cattle 2230 1787 1435 1543
pig farming 126 161 255 249
Table 1: Number of farms used for all our calculations.
in absolute numbers in percentages
′91 ′92 ′99 ′00 ′91 ′92 ′99 ′00
sheep and goat 82 35 0 0 21.0 9.4 0.0 0.0
cattle 1373 1198 439 230 61.6 67.0 30.6 14.9
pig farming 72 66 22 17 57.1 41.0 8.6 6.8
Table 2: Number of farms used for all our calculations not receiving direct payments.
We define the production function of farms with the following two outputs and five inputs
in monetary values at the current prices as reflected in the farm accounts.
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OUTPUTS pbveg plant output
pbanim animal output
INPUTS capital capital, especially buildings and machinery
costsg fodder and other animal linked inputs
costs inputs crop linked (fertilizer, agro-chemicals, seeds, water
and other crop specific inputs, fuels and lubricants)
salary wages
land Agricultural Utilized Area of farm aggregate adjusted for quality
(thus including pasture and agricultural land adjusted for quality)
SP shadow price; the costs for producing without Direct Payments.
The so called “shadow price” (SP) is calculated from the total amount of direct payments
a farm receives (including premiums), denoted by DP, but with a negative sign: therefore
we set SP= −DP. Direct payments include any amount of cash received under the CAP or
national regulation and not linked to an amount of production (e.g. set aside payments,
livestock premia, etc.). Capital input includes machinery, transport equipment and struc-
tures (not dwellings). For simplicity all animals are treated as variable stock. Land is
considered as a separate input variable. Land area is adjusted by quality. This means that
we calculated the value of input “land” by
land value = sauirr * psauirr + saudry * psaudry ,
where sauirr: Agricultural Utilized Area (AUA) irrigated (Ha.); saudry: AUA non-irrigated
(Ha.); psauirr: price AUA irrigated by region (Euros/Ha); psaudry: price AUA non-irrigated
by region (Euros/Ha).
The efficiency cannot be directly observed and must be estimated in a first step by DEA.
In the Appendix we give a brief introduction to the DEA method explaining in detail its
exact definition and indicating how it is calculated in practice. We include here some useful
remarks to understand the basic ideas of the procedure.
As animal and plant outputs cannot be substituted, we must not aggregate them, but
estimate efficiency as a two dimensional output problem. There are two reasons why we
preferred not to consider direct payments as a third output: First, many farms have zero
subsidies and would thus form a non-interpretable hyper-plane in the DEA; furthermore,
the subsidies are not actually produced by the inputs considered, so there is no reasonable
argument for allowing them to come along on the left hand side of the production function.
Alternatively, in DEA, including a variable as output or as negative input will give the
same interpretation for the efficiency. Moreover, DP as negative inputs can be understood
as including shadow prices representing the costs paid for not producing in a subsidized
manner.
It could be discussed whether more input variables should be allowed to enter into the DEA
production function, in order to get stronger results with respect to larger differences in the
efficiency index for example. However, this question is nothing more than a discussion of
the bias – variance trade off: more aggregating leads to more bias but less variance and vice
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versa. We have opted here for high resolution, in other words, high variance, small bias and
thus, none of our results will suffer errors due to possible misspecification.
In a first scenario we calculate efficiency with direct payments, in a second scenario without.
We designate as EW the efficiency without direct payments which corresponds more to
productivity, and EDP to conventional efficiency which includes to crop subsidies.
The economic behavior of the holding under CAP is a trade off between the choice of
agricultural productions with a certain level of subsidies and other non-subsidized outputs.
Thus, the differences we see when looking at EW vs. when looking at EDP indicate the
level of efficiency distortion on the economic behavior of the holding. Under the current
multifunction farming, on top of the income for selling on the market, farmers qualify for
rewards to compensate market failures by pricing positive externalities. So the farmer incurs
an opportunity cost of not meeting the conditions to receive DP (e.g. minimum land per
livestock head).
We repeat efficiency calculations for two years before and two years after CAP’92, to test for
whether the CAP reform had promoted efficiency and environmentally friendly practices.
We took always two years to take into account the influence of random weather variability
(e.g. pasture availability). Furthermore, the sample is divided into type of animal farming
(cattle farming, pig farming, and sheep and goat) as these farms are neither uniform in
the treatment by CAP nor in the production process. Summarizing: we carried out both
estimations (with and without DP) for 1991, 1992, 1999 and 2000 for cattle, pig, and sheep
and goat farms.
Once the efficiency indices are calculated, we use these results to analyze the changes caused
by the CAP’92 reform by different methods (correlations and semi parametric regression).
Key variables of our study now are the size measured by European Size Units (ESU) and
a proxy for measuring how environmental friendly (EF) the farm is. As we analyze the
subsidies policy here, for a fair evaluation, we use the same proxy the EU generally uses,
i.e. livestock unit equivalents per agricultural utilized area, EF = (LU/AUA) =.3 The
LU/AUA is used in the European regulation and is generally considered a good proxy of the
environmental performance of the farm, see also remarks in the Introduction. As we men-
tioned in the introduction, one could also say animal adapted but we use this synonymously
for environmental adapted because of various reasons, among others: the animal density is
proportional to the nitrogen production; on average, the extensive farms (low animal den-
sity) generate positive external economies like the preservation of the natural ecosystem.
Note that EF is certainly inverse proportional to being environmental adapted. As the pol-
icy faces different targets simultaneously such as productivity, cross compliance, and small
farm protection, we need more sophisticated instruments to contrast these objectives.
More specifically, we use two regression models to study the level of compatibility between
different targets of the new CAP, including environmental adaptation and competitiveness
at the farm level. The objective is to quantify the impact on efficiency when the CAP’92
3The aggregation of the LU is made with the standard procedure used by FADN and EUROSTAT. The
variables come from the individual accounting collected under FADN normalization. The detailed input and
output information of each farm account is fully utilized to calculate the aggregate variables that include all
production costs.
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increased the direct payments. Our model has efficiency as the dependent variable and the
explicative variable is environmental adaptation, filtering out the regional and size effects:
E = g[ln(EF ), ln(ESU)] + βTR+ e , (1)
where E is first economic efficiency EDP (efficiency with direct payments), then conventional
efficiency (productivity in monetary terms) EW (efficiency without direct payments). For
a more detailed explanation see Kleinhanß, Murillo, San Juan, and Sperlich (2006) where
similar methods are used though for a different study comparing countries in one subsidy
system instead of comparing systems (before and after the CAP’92) for one country. EF
indicates the degree of animal density, ESU is the European Size Unit, and R is a vector of
dummy variables for agricultural region divided into North, Center, Northeast, South and
East. Recall that we use EF as an inverse proxy for animal adaptation (or environmental
friendliness, see discussion above). Note that the smaller the EF, the more “environmentally
friendly” the farm. In the next section it will be seen how the comparison of these two
regressions (i.e. one with EDP , one without subsidies EW ) helps us to better understand
the impact of subsidy policy in practice.
Note that the function g : IR2 → IR is nonparametric, i.e. not specified further. As we will
see, the impact of ln(EF ) and ln(ESU) show strong nonlinearities and severe interactions.
The term e stands for the not further specified heterogeneity. As g(·, ·) is non-parametric,
the logarithm does not impose any model specification here. This transformation is only
due to smoothing necessities, see Appendix for further details.
3 Empirical Results, Interpretation and Comments
3.1 Calculation of Efficiency with DEA
We first calculate the efficiency with the aid of DEA. These results will be used for most of
our further conclusions relating efficiency with different economic and policy factors. In this
sense it is mainly an auxiliary step. As a byproduct, based on these results we are also able
to check the effect of certain agricultural extension programs on efficiency. Note that we will
not separate the two scenarios (with and without subsidies) into two subsections because we
are not so much interested in the result of each individually but in the differences between
them.
In order to address the question “what are the subsidies related to in practice?” we must
first clarify the question of modelling.
The correlation target is to quantify the relationship between efficiency, the farm size, the an-
imal density and the fact that the farmer qualify for direct payments. To account of both, ab-
solute and relative mean increases, we have estimated the following correlations and their p-
values: corr(DP,EW ), corr(ln(1+DP ), EW ), corr(DP,ESU), corr(ln(1+DP ), ln(ESU)),
corr(DP,EF ), corr(ln(1 +DP ), ln(EF )). It is conspicuous that efficiency calculated with
DP will be (positively) related to DP. Therefore we considered here only EW , efficiency cal-
culated without DP. Recall that EW can also be interpreted as productivity. The numerical
results for these correlations can be found in Tables 3 to 5 separated only by animal-type.
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Cattle ’91 ’92 ’99 ’00
corr(DP,EW ) -.023* .050 .011* .135
corr(ln(1 +DP ), EW ) -.158 -.059 .110 .090
corr(DP,ESU) .100 .254 .657 .616
corr(ln(1 +DP ), ln(ESU)) .024* .085 .226 .164
corr(DP,EF ) -.012* -.115 -.127 -.181
corr(ln(1 +DP ), ln(EF )) -.079 -.166 -.185 -.196
Table 3: Correlations for Cattle farms; an asteriks means not significant at 5% level.
Pigs ’91 ’92 ’99 ’00
corr(DP,EW ) .011* -.310 -.053* -.146
corr(ln(1 +DP ), EW ) -.208 -.460 -.309 -.237
corr(DP,ESU) .133* .309 .489 .168
corr(ln(1 +DP ), ln(ESU)) .110* .298 .119* .028
corr(DP,EF ) .301 -.196 -.089* -.143
corr(ln(1 +DP ), ln(EF )) -.119* -.114* -.131 -.384
Table 4: Correlations for Pig farms; an asterisk means not significant at 5% level.
For an easier interpretation, let us briefly summarize the signs we see in the tables. In Table
6 we have summarized first the pair {corr(DP,EW ),corr(ln(1+DP ), EW )} in the first two
lines, the signs of the pair {corr(DP,ESU),corr(ln(1 + DP ), ln(ESU))} in lines 3 and 4,
and of the pair {corr(DP,EF ),corr(ln(1 +DP ), ln(EF ))} in the last two lines.
As to the relation between subsidies and efficiency we find that before CAP’92 there is no
positive impact of subsidies on productivity (EW ), see Table 6. Looking at the effect of
relative subsidy increase, the impact is even negative. Something similar happens during
the period following CAP’92, except in the case of cattle farms. However, the impact of
absolute increase of subsidies on productivity is positive for cattle, and sheep & goat, but
negative for pig farms after ’92.
Turning to the relationship between direct payments and economic size, we see that this is
always (clearly) positive, see Table 6. This means that no matter whether we measure in
absolute or relative terms, the policy always benefits the larger farms more strongly. This
policy did not change with the CAP’92
Finally, regarding the relationship between DP and EF (recall that the higher the EF the
more intensively), we see no change of signs for cattle farms (always negative), but some for
pigs, and sheep & goat farms respectively. There, along the detected signs the relationship
between subsidies and extensive farming has increased after CAP’92, compare again Table
6.
We now come to an interpretation of the (more informative) numerical results, say levels,
given in Tables 3 to 5. Again we start with the relation between DP and productivity (EW )
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Sheep and Goat ’91 ’92 ’99 ’00
corr(DP,EW ) .034* -.048* .048* .092
corr(ln(1 +DP ), EW ) -.057* -.160 -.205 -.096
corr(DP,ESU) .223 .298 .968 .973
corr(ln(1 +DP ), ln(ESU)) .099 .159 .596 .571
corr(DP,EF ) .014* .023* -.082* -.086
corr(ln(1 +DP ), ln(EF )) -.072* -.090* -.127 -.130
Table 5: Correlations for sheep and goat farms; an asterisk means not significant at 5%
level.
cattle pig sheep and goat
Before CAP’92 0 – 0 – 0 –
After CAP’92 + + – – + –
Before CAP’92 + + + + + +
After CAP’92 + + + + + +
Before CAP’92 – – 0 – + –
After CAP’92 – – – – – –
Table 6: Signs of correlations: the pair {corr(DP,EW ),corr(ln(1 + DP ), EW )}
in lines 1,2; pair {corr(DP,ESU),corr(ln(1 + DP ), ln(ESU))} in lines 3,4; pair
{corr(DP,EF ),corr(ln(1 +DP ), ln(EF ))} in lines 5,6.
looking first at the levels. Here, we hardly see any changes caused by CAP’92 in any type
of farm with almost all of them being close to zero. When subsidies rise in relative terms we
detect significant changes only for cattle farms. Apart from this, at the same time we see a
positive correlation between subsidies and efficiency when looking at the absolute amounts;
in almost all cases the mean efficiency decreases as the percentage of direct payments rises
in. This means that a combination of direct subsidies and economic size (ESU) would be
counterproductive.
So, let us look now at the relation between DP and economic size, still looking at Tables 3 to
5. The correlations strongly increase for cattle and sheep & goat after the CAP’92, actually
over 90% in some cases. In other words, since the CAP’92, the level of subsidies can mainly
be linked to farm size. That is not surprising since set-aside payments and animal premia
are related to the area and number of animals respectively. So, after CPA’92, direct payment
correlation with farm size shows the level of real “modulation” of the post CAP’92 subsidies.
Thus, our results are also congruent with the generally accepted hypothesis, see e.g. OECD
(2001) and references therein, that direct subsidies are basically (even if indirectly) linked to
output level especially after CAP’92. So it is difficult to defend the presumable decoupled
characteristic of these aids. Moreover, our findings indicate a strong coupling of size and
premia since CAP’92.
Turning finally to the target of supporting extensive farming (i.e. animal adapted farms),
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we do not find as clear a trend as we saw for economic size, compare Tables 3 to 5. Indeed,
the results differ somewhat on the measure, see e.g. Table 4, in sign as well as in the level.
Therefore we will use a more sophisticated approach to deal with this problem (see the
following nonparametric regression study).
3.2 A Nonparametric Regression Analysis of the Efficiency
For a further analysis we need to relate the efficiency and / or productivity to size (ESU),
EF , and regions via a proper regression model. For this purpose we consider now equation
(1) with E being EDP (DP included in model) or EW respectively (DP not included in
model). By comparing the results of these two regressions (i.e. using two different dependent
variables), we will see how the CAP policy distorts the efficiency of an individual farm. The
estimation procedures applied here are explained in the Appendix.
First, let us look at the regional effects before and after CAP’92, i.e. the estimates of the
β-parameter in regression model (1). We split up Spain into 5 regions: North, Center,
Andalusia, Ebro (along the Ebro river), and Levante. The last one has been employed
as a normalizing region. Note that Levante could correspond for “East” , and Andalusia
for “South”. Ebro stands for the northeastern Spanish region including the northeastern
Mediterranean coast and the Ebro river valley both with a chiefly Mediterranean climate that
traditionally has been conceived them as an homogenous agricultural region. All numerical
results are given in Tables 7 and 8.
Before CAP’92 (Table 7): Surprisingly, the North was less efficient in cattle farming whereas
the center is more efficient than other regions. In pig farms as well as with sheep and goats,
all regions seem to be very close except for the ones in Levante.
After CAP’92 (Table 8): Amazingly, the North and Ebro regions seem to be less efficient.
These results are only insignificant for pig farming in 2000 and in 1999 when looking at EW .
Levante seems to be best for cattle farming, though not significantly better than the center
and the south. These aspects scarcely alter in both, the model with dependent variables
EDP and its counterfactual opposite, using EW .
These findings might intuitively surprise experts in Spanish animal farming although we
must point out here that in Levante we only have less than 10 farms in the sample, which
turned out to be technically quite advanced holdings. As we are not so much interested in
analyzing the regional differences, but only wish to correct for them, this is fortunately not
a reason for further concern.
As the functional form of g(·, ·) in model (1) is non-parametric, the results are given graph-
ically, see Figures 2 to 7 where we displayed the numerical results for g(·, ·). Note that
g(·, ·) is a three dimensional graph throughout. Along our empirical results, the two regres-
sors ln(EF ), ln(ESU) unfortunately do not enter additively. That means, as can be seen
in Figure 1, that it is not enough to look at the purely marginal effects of ln(EF ), and
ln(ESU) respectively, because they have strong interaction. However, for ease of presen-
tation we decided not to show the three dimensional graphs but did present the marginal
impacts of ln(EF ) (on EDP and EW ) of the median sized (measured in ESU) farms (solid
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1991 1992
dep.var. North Center Andal. Ebro North Center Andal. Ebro
Cattle
EDP -.0456 .17394 -.0293 – -.0526 .13902 -.0576 –
.02882 .02889 .03777 – .02871 .02847 .03337 –
EW -.0503 .16486 -.0281 – -.0509 .11145 -.0541 –
.02790 .02796 .03656 – .02834 .02811 .03294 –
Pig
EDP -.0561 -.0055 -.1349 – -.0837 -.1672 -.0170 -.1007
.15622 .03757 .06438 – .13541 .12468 .14456 .12193
EW -.0540 -.0036 -.1327 – -.0789 -.2114 -.0686 -.1203
.15644 .03762 .06446 – .13201 .12155 .14093 .11887
Sheep and Goat
EDP -.4545 -.4618 -.4585 -.4520 -.3565 -.3415 -.3350 -.3739
.16941 .16233 .16977 .16230 .18921 .17782 .18102 .17911
EW -.4739 -.4722 -.4559 -.4703 -.3779 -.3900 -.3822 -.3992
.16441 .15754 .16475 .15751 .18341 .17237 .17547 .17362
Table 7: Estimates (upper lines) with standard error (lower lines) for the regional effects
before CAP’92. In 1991 we have neither pig nor cattle farms observed in Levante, the
reference region is Ebro, or else Levante. In 1992 we have no cattle farms observed in
Levante, the reference region is Ebro, or else Levante.
ln EF -0.80
0.22
1.24
1.26 2.07
2.89
ln ESU
0.55
0.72
0.90
-0.80
0.22
1.24
ln EF1.262.07
2.89
ln ESU
0.53
0.71
0.90
Figure 1: Cattle farms in 1991, with dependent variable EDP (left), respectively EW (right).
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1999 2000
North Center Andal. Ebro North Center Andal. Ebro
Cattle
EDP -.4617 -.2189 -.3761 -.4907 -.4192 -.1790 -.3592 -.4065
.10397 .10400 .11497 .10549 .08852 .08943 .10014 .09058
EW -.4672 -.2537 -.3298 -.5062 -.4233 -.2001 -.3419 -.4030
.10214 .10217 .11295 .10364 .08752 .08842 .09901 .08955
Pig
EDP -.3459 -.0607 .08320 -.0926 -.0329 -.0160 .20771 -.0460
.15810 .04511 .08340 .03744 .11033 .05789 .09105 .04707
EW -.2148 -.0158 .12308 -.0410 -.0948 -.0195 .05673 -.0431
.15722 .04486 .08294 .03723 .10395 .05454 .08578 .04434
Sheep and Goat
EDP -.1201 -.0228 -.0901 -.1380 -.1049 -.0726 -.2321 -.2156
.06367 .04137 .05517 .04526 .05082 .03033 .03679 .03437
EW -.1459 -.0326 -.0989 -.1851 -.0969 -.0667 -.2181 -.2632
.05864 .03811 .05081 .04168 .04845 .02891 .03506 .03276
Table 8: Estimates (upper lines) with standard error (lower lines) for the regional effects
after CAP’92. The reference region is Levante.
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Figure 2: Cattle farms in 1991 (left) and 1992 (right), EDP on ln(EF ). median sized farms:
solid lines; large farms: dotted lines; small farms dashed lines.
line), the large farms (the upper 95% quantile farms with respect to ESU, dotted line), and
the small farms (the lower 5% quantile farms, dashed line). Note that when looking at
marginal impacts, the single impact of one variable on efficiency can be greater than one
or also be negative. The three resulting (2 dimensional) functions represent three slices of
the three dimensional plot. However, for a better understanding we also provide the three
dimensional plot of g(·, · for cattle farms in 1991, see Figure 1. More specific, in Figure 1
is plotted function g(·, ·) (vertical axis) on its arguments ln(EF ), ln(ESU). In all of the
graphs shown, the outer 2% are cut off (i.e. not plotted) to avoid interpreting the boundary
effects.
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Figure 3: Cattle farms in 1999 (left) and 2000 (right), EDP on ln(EF ) (upper row), and
EW on ln(EF ) (lower row). median sized farms: solid lines; large farms: dotted lines; small
farms dashed lines.
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Figure 4: Pig farms in 1991 (left) and 1992 (right), EDP on ln(EF ) (left). median sized
farms: solid lines; large farms: dotted lines; small farms dashed lines.
Let us have a look at the differences between the regression of EDP compared to the regres-
sion of EW . Before the CAP’92 reform (Figures 2, 4, 6) we could not find differences between
the two regressions, and therefore have given here only the results for EDP . This could be
interpreted as there being no effect of direct payments on efficiency versus productivity.
This changes with the CAP’92 reform. For cattle farms (Figure 3) we again obtain the same
results for the two regressions, whereas for pig holdings the DP now favor the extensive and
in particular the large holdings (compare Figure 5 left with right side). Since DP do not
exist per pig head, this is possibly due to DP related to crop and environmental issues
which would explain that the large farms benefit especially. E.g. Iberian pigs grazing in the
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Figure 5: Pig farms in 1999 (left) and 2000 (right), EDP on ln(EF ) (upper row), and EW
on ln(EF ) (lower row). median sized farms: solid lines; large farms: dotted lines; small
farms dashed lines.
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Figure 6: Sheep and goat farms in 1991 (left) and 1992 (right), EDP on ln(EF ) (left).
median sized farms: solid lines; large farms: dotted lines; small farms dashed lines.
Mediterranean forest need large plots of land for grazing but are quite profitable due to the
high prices their meat yields on the market. Also for sheep & goat farms, we see after the
CAP’92 that now including DP in the efficiency changes the regression, see Figure 7. For
any size of farm it seems that the DP especially favor farms that are identified as being
intensive holdings (right tail).
Comparing the numerical results from before with those after the CAP’92 reform we detect
that extensive farms are not better situated (compared to intensive holdings) in terms of
relative efficiency levels. Also the efficiency rankings by size remain unchanged by the ’92
reform. In any case, it is hard to make clear statements because the results vary greatly
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Figure 7: Sheep and goat farms in 1999 (left) and 2000 (right), EDP on ln(EF ) (upper
row), and EW on ln(EF ) (lower row). median sized farms: solid lines; large farms: dotted
lines; small farms dashed lines.
with the years. Focusing only on the median farms, one might say that after the CAP
reform the efficiency difference between intensive and extensive farms has become smaller.
The scenario without direct subsidies upholds all our results.
The efficiency of the intensive pig farms is clearly above that of the environmentally friendly
farms before, and also after the CAP reform. However, after ’92 the distance to the more
environmental friendly farms has also become smaller, i.e. the plotted functions have flat-
tened. The scenario ignoring the subsidies when calculating the efficiency, upholds these
results as well.
Finally, when looking at the sheep & goat we find the following. Before CAP’92 there is
a clear positive impact of ln(EF ) on efficiency (both, EDP and EW ) for any size of farm,
whereas this impact becomes strongly U-shaped after CAP’92. This means that extensive
holdings are now relatively better off than before. However, this statement is only true for
small and median sized farms. Furthermore, the rankings by size changed after ’92 putting
the small farms in a better situation than before. In any case, the large, intensive farms
remain at all times the most productive and efficient ones even though these differences
narrowed after CAP’92.
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4 Conclusions
The results clearly show the real difficulties of the reformed CAP in reaching the objective
of increasing the efficiency and the environmental orientation of the farms simultaneously.
The empirical evidence show a positive correlation between subsidies and efficiency when
looking at the absolute amounts. However, the mean efficiency decreases or stagnates as the
percentage of direct payments rise. This means that a combination of direct subsidies and
size is counterproductive. Our results also show that this is what the subvention policy after
CAP’92 was doing much more than before. The heavy subsidization of large farms cannot
be justified with their presumably high efficiency nor environmental friendliness. Neither
our graphical nor our numerical results confirm such a hypothesis; they may, in fact, even
contradict.
We have found that economies of scale seem to be important before and after CAP’92, but
we have found several exceptions, see e.g. the pig holdings. The small intensive pig farms
performed rather well before and after CAP’92. Also the small cattle farms are above the
mean efficiency index. This reflects the shortcomings of the managers in running the farm
and solving technical problems when the economic size increases above a certain threshold,
a finding that concords with Alvarez and Arias (2003).
After CAP’92 the environmentally friendly hog holdings reach efficiency levels similar to
those of the most conventional (intensive) farms when accounting for direct payments. This
was not the case before CAP’92. In contrast, for the cattle farms the order of efficiency
between small to big and intensive to extensive farms does not change with DP, neither
before nor after the CAP reform. For sheep & goats finally, we cannot detect an effect of
DP before, and only a marginal one after CAP’92. Small extensive farms seem to benefit a
little bit since the reform.
However, all together the less environmentally adapted farms are still the most efficient
ones. Thus, together with the numerical results on correlations, we conclude that there is
empirical evidence that the subsidy system after CAP’92 was somewhat more “environmen-
tally oriented” for all types of farms studied than it was before CAP’92. Notice further that
our results show a significant positive correlation of the DP and EF, i.e. direct payment
were negatively correlated with animal density, for the years after CAP’92. That makes
a difference with the situation before the CAP reform where we can not find a significant
correlation between direct payments and environmental adaptation.
So the conclusion that the DP structure after ’92 played a role in helping farms to preserve
the natural environment under competitive conditions is empirically supported by our re-
sults. However, we have found also that the DP system introduced by CAP’92 was not
sufficient to correct the fact that the less environmentally friendly farms as well as the big
ones are more efficient. Moreover, the empirical results show especially for sheep & goat and
cattle farming that there is room for improvement of the environmental implementation of
the CAP.
Summarizing, our comparison of the situation before with that of after the CAP’92 reform,
cannot lead us to conclude that the claimed objectives would have been reached; partly the
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effects have gone in the right direction, partly not. Neither the small nor the more animal
adapted farmers benefit from the subsidy policy whereas the large ones mainly do. This,
moreover is counterproductive. The changes we have observed for Spain due to the CAP’92
are marginal, although visible in some cases, concerning the claimed objectives, but strong
concerning the non-claimed objectives (e.g. linked to economic size).
5 Appendix: Methodologies
Even though these methodologies are not completely new, part of the readership might not
be familiar either with DEA or with nonparametric regression. Therefore we give here a
brief insight in order to achieve a better understanding and interpretation of the results
presented later.
5.1 Estimation of (Technical) Efficiency
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a non-parametric approach for evaluating the perfor-
mance (“the best practice”) of a set of peer units called DMUs (decision making units) by
using linear programming methods. We introduce here some basic concepts of the method
(see Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2000) for a complete description of the methodology).
Let consider an economic sector where firms produce q outputs with p inputs whom we may
define, following Simar and Wilson (2000)’s notation, the next set of feasible input-output
combinations:
Ψ = {(x, y) ∈ IRp+q : x can produce y}. (2)
For any y we specify the input requirement set as
X(y) = {x ∈ IRp : (x, y) ∈ Ψ}, (3)
where the input efficient frontier is defined by:
δX(y) = {x ∈ X(y) : θx /∈ X(y) ∀θ < 1} . (4)
Efficiency measures for each firm (Farrell, 1957) θ(x, y) are then obtained as the following
maximum contraction of inputs along a fixed ray:
θ(x, y) = inf{θ : θx ∈ X(y)} . (5)
Note that in our text θ is E (Efficiency with or without DP). A value of θ = 1 means that
the producer is input efficient while a value of θ < 1 indicates technical inefficiency and the
producer may reduce inputs in that proportion while upholding the output level.4
As the model is non-parametric, the estimation of all the above unknown concepts by DEA
requires to assume convexity and free disposability of inputs and outputs for the produc-
tion possibility set (see Fa¨re, Grosskopf and Lovell,1994 for a more detailed description of
4Alternatively, one could formulate (4) to (5) as an output oriented problem. However, in practice, the
interpretation is then often more complicated, in particular considering how to include direct payments in
the production function.
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the characterization of the technology). So the estimate of equation (2) under the least
restrictive returns to scale assumption (i.e. variable returns5) for a sample of n producers
is:
Ψ̂ = {(x, y) ∈ <p+q : x ≥
n∑
i=1
γixi, y ≤
n∑
i=1
γiyi,
n∑
i=1
γi = 1, ∀γi ≥ 0}, (6)
where: γi is the intensity vector of firm i and it defines its best practice or benchmark firm
by a linear combination of all the firms observed in the sample. Note that here we are using
(x, y) as a context variable and not with same meaning as in Section 6 above.
Equally, estimates of equations (3) and (4) are then
Xˆ(y) = {x ∈ <p | (x, y) ∈ Ψˆ}, δXˆ(y) = {x ∈ Xˆ(y) | θx /∈ Xˆ(y) , ∀θ < 1}, (7)
while the efficiency measure (equation 5) is estimated by linear programming techniques as
follows:
θˆ(xj , yj) = min{θ :
n∑
i=1
γixi ≤ θxj , yj ≤
n∑
i=1
γiyi ,
n∑
i=1
γi = 1 , ∀γi ≥ 0}. (8)
Firm j is technically efficient if and only if θˆ(xj , yj) = 1 and it is located on the frontier while
a value as θˆ(xj , yj) < 1 means that the firm is inefficient and is located under the frontier.
Technical efficiency is then calculated for each unit without needing to specify a particular
functional form for the production frontier, though the main withdraw of the method is the
absence of a random error term in the estimation. In any case, and under some regularity
assumptions on the data generating process, DEA provides consistent estimation of all the
above concepts (see Kneip, A., L. Simar and P. Wilson (2003) for a review of DEA statistical
properties).
5.2 Regression Analysis
As mentioned in the main text, we do not want to assume any particular functional form
on g(·, ·) except that it is a smooth function, i.e. has continuous second derivatives.
We explain the estimation of the parameters β and the asymptotic covariance of the esti-
mators, as well as the estimation of the non-parametric function of g(·, ·) in a semipara-
metric model of the form as described in equation (1). We assume E[e|EF,ESU,R] = 0,
V ar[e] <∞. The estimation of g(·) and β will be made in two steps: first the estimation
of β and its covariance using the method of Robinson (1988), and afterwards the estimation
of g(·, ·) using local linear smoothing by Ruppert and Wand (1994). For a more detailed
introduction to non- and semi-parametric modelling see also Ha¨rdle, Mu¨ller, Sperlich, and
Werwatz (2004).
The basic idea is to construct an estimator that gives simply a smooth surface (or hyper-
plane), e.g. in the one dimensional case a smooth line, that fits best into the point cloud of
real observations. The smoothness of that surface can be (pre-) determined by choosing a
5The assumption of variable returns to scale is suitable when not all firms are operating at the optimal
scale and it ensures that an inefficient firm is only ”benchmarked” against firms of similar size.
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respectively large smoothing parameter h , called bandwidth. Actually, this parameter can
also often be data driven.
First, it is important to understand that this estimator works locally, e.g. we estimate the
desired function, the hyper-plane, separately at each point we are interested in. Therefore
we need to introduce some additional notations. Consider for a moment a regression problem
of the form E[Y |X = x0] = G(x0), Y ∈ < ,X,x ∈ <d with G(·) : <d → < being an unknown
smooth function. Imagine we aim to estimate G(x0) for some point x0 ∈ <d. Having
observed {Xi, Yi}ni=1 , this can be done by local least squares:(
Gˆ(x0)
∇̂G(x0)
)
= argmin
a0,a1
n∑
i=1
{
Yi − a0 − aT1 (Xi − x0)
}2
Kh(Xi − x0) , (9)
a0 ∈ <, a1 ∈ <d and ∇G(·) being the gradient of G(·). Further, Kh(v) =
∏d
j=1
1
hK(
vj
h ) is a
<d → < weight function. In our calculations we chose K(v) = 1516(1− v2)211{|v| ≤ 1}. So we
used a weighted least squares estimator for linear regression that becomes a local (linear)
estimator due to the weights Kh giving a lot of weight to points (Xi, Yi) where Xi is close
to x0 but zero weights to points far from x0. Consistency, asymptotic theory and properties
are well known and studied for the multivariate case in Ruppert and Wand (1994). For a
general introduction see Fan and Gijbels (1996).
If we eliminate the vector a1 in equation (9) and thus maximize only over a0, the minimizing
argument is a local constant estimator of G(x0). In this case it is easy to give the explicit
formula:
G˜(x0) =
∑n
i=1Kh(Xi − x0)Yi∑n
i=1Kh(Xi − x0)
. (10)
As one can see, in the weighting function, the smoothing parameter h comes in: the larger
the h, and consequently the environment with positive weighting, the smoother the resulting
hyper-plane (i.e. h → ∞ gives a linear function for G whereas h = 0 yields a G being the
interpolation of the Yi’s). In a context such as ours, the choice of the smoothing param-
eter should be considered as degrees of freedom which would be chosen, i.e. the empirical
researcher would allow for more flexibility or impose more smoothness on its functions. To
allow for high flexibility without increasing the variance to unreasonable levels, we chose
smoothing parameters that did not restrict the functional forms unless the plotted surface
became wiggly.
Coming back to our model (1), we will apply the local linear estimation method, i.e. equation
(9), on {Wi := (ln(EFi), ln(ESUi)), (Ei − βˆRi)}ni=1. The remaining question is how to get
βˆ. The estimator of β is defined as
βˆ = S−1
R−R˜,R−R˜SR−R˜,E−E˜ (11)
where for any matrix or vector sequences Ri, Bi we set SR,B = 1n
∑n
i=1RiB
T
i and R˜i =
Ê[Ri|Wi], B˜i = Ê[Bi|Wi] with Bi being either Ri or Ei. We estimate the conditional
expectations (Ê) via local constant smoother as defined in the equation (10). It is easy
to see that the variance of βˆ can be estimated by σˆ2S−1
R−R˜,R−R˜ with σˆ
2 being a consistent
estimator of the conditional variance of E: σ2 = V ar[E|Wi, Ri]. For more details see
Robinson (1988).
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Furthermore, note that as g(·, ·) is non-parametric, we could have directly used the co-
variates ESU and EF in the model (1). As mentioned above, the logarithm therefore does
not impose any model specification here. The problem is that both variables have a rather
skewed distribution with many data-sparse areas. In contrast, ln(ESU) as well as ln(EF )
look quite normal around the mode with rather short tails at the end. It is thus only for
the sake of a reasonable behavior of our smoothing techniques that we prefer to apply our
smoothing methods on the log-transformed data, see also Biedermann and Dette (2003) for
more details.
In non- and semi-parametric regression, the choice of smoothness controlled via the band-
width (named h in Section 5.2) and chosen by the empirical researcher, is often either not
discussed or quite controversial. Therefore, we tried out several bandwidths and present
here the results for those where the estimated surface starts to become smooth. In practice,
for two dimensions and smooth densities as we have in this application, this provides a rea-
sonable trade-off between bias and variance of the estimates. For the parametric part β of
model (1) it should be emphasized that the results for the (semi-) parametric estimation of
the regional dummies turned out to be quite robust with respect to the bandwidth choice for
the non-parametric part. This is expected if for example the regional dummies are almost
uncorrelated with the other covariates (ln(ESU) and ln(EF ) in our case). More details on
the methodology are available on request.
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